

Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 EA-06 NEA-09 IO-10 ISO-00 ERDA-05 AF-06

ARA-06 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-03 H-02 INR-07 L-02 NASA-01

NSAE-00 NSC-05 OIC-02 SP-02 PA-01 PRS-01 OES-03 SS-15

USIA-06 SAJ-01 NRC-05 /121 W
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FM USMISSION GENEVA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2740

INFO AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY BERN

AMEMBASSY DUBLIN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

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AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY OTTAWA

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AMEMBASSY TOKYO

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AMEMBASSY WARSAW

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EO: 11652: N/A

TAGS: PARM

SUBJ: NPT REVCON: PLENARY GENERAL DEBATE, MAY 7

1. SUMMARY: GENERAL DEBATE CONTINUED MAY 7 WITH STATEMENTS BY IRELAND, ROMANIA, POLAND, IRAN, JAPAN, DENMARK, CANADA, BULGARIA, PERU, AND SWITZERLAND. HIGHLIGHTS FOLLOW. FULL TEXTS POUCHED TO ACDA/IR. END SUMMARY.

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2. GAYNOR (IRELAND) INDICATED THAT, WHETHER FINAL DOCUMENT OF

CONFERENCE TAKES FORM OF DECLARATION OR PROTOCOLS, COMMITMENTS MUST BE SUCH AS TO PERMIT CLEAR DISTINCTION IN FUTURE BETWEEN PROMISE AND PERFORMANCE. HE URGED THAT: (1) SUPERPOWERS SET OUT CLEAR TIMETABLE FOR NEGOTIATIONS UNDER ARTICLE 6, (2) NWS COMMIT THEMSELVES NOT TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS AGAINST NNWS, BUT, IF PROGRESS CURRENTLY NOT POSSIBLE ON THIS MATTER, CONFERENCE SHOULD TAKE UP QUESTION OF NUCLEAR-FREE ZONES. SECURITY ASSURANCES TO NFZS WOULD BE FIRST STEP TOWARD ASSURANCES TO ALL NPT PARTIES, (3) NUCLEAR EXPORTERS SHOULD ONLY MAKE AVAILABLE NUCLEAR FUELS, EQUIPMENT, AND TECHNOLOGY TO COUNTRIES WITH SAFEGUARDS ON ENTIRE FUEL CYCLE, (4) INCREASED TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE BE MADE AVAILABLE WITH PREFERENCE FOR NPT PARTIES AND THAT SUCH SUPPLEMENTARY VOLUNTARY AID TO NPT PARTIES BE ADMINISTERED BY IAEA SECRETARIAT, AND (5) TIME SCALE BE SET BY CONFERENCE FOR COMMENCEMENT OF DISCUSSIONS IN IAEA OF ALL OTHER ASPECTS OF PROBLEM.

3. GLIBA (ROMANIAN DEP MIN OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS) STRESSED NEED FOR FULLER IMPLEMENTATION OF ARTICLES IV, V, AND VI AND ASKED FOR A SOLEMN OBLIGATION OF NWS NEVER TO USE OR THREATEN TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS AGAINST NNWS IN ANY CIRCUMSTANCES. HE ALSO SUPPORTED IDEA OF BALKAN NUCLEAR FREE ZONE.

4. TREPCZYNSKI (POLISH VICE FOREIGN MINISTER) AND PETROV (BULGARIAN DEP MIN OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS) BOTH DELIVERED RAMBLING STATEMENTS ECHOING SOVIET LINE, WITH REFERENCE TO SALT, CSCE, DETENTE, MBFR, CCD, ETC.

5. FARTASH (IRAN) CHARGED NWS HAVE FAILED TO LIVE UP TO ARTICLE VI PLEDGE AND CALLED FOR CONFERENCE TO SEEK COMMITMENT FOR REDUCTIONS BY "CERTAIN DATE." HE CALLED FOR CTB, BUT INDICATED, AS FIRST STEP, THAT IRAN WOULD SUPPORT UK SUGGESTION TO LIMIT NUMBER OF ANNUAL UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTS. ON SECURITY ASSURANCES, HE SAID NUCLEAR POWERS SHOULD, AT MINIMUM, PLEDGE NOT TO THREATEN OR USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS AGAINST NNWS PARTIES TO NPT. HE SUPPORTED NUCLEAR FREE ZONES AS MEANS OF PROMOTING NON-PROLIFERATION AND REFERRED SPECIFICALLY TO IRANIAN NFZ PROPOSAL FOR MIDDLE EAST. NOTING SEVERAL FACTORS THAT MOTIVATE "NEAR-NUCLEARS" TO ACQUIRE NUCLEAR WEAPONS, HE SAID THAT, BECAUSE OF EASE WITH WHICH CRUDE BOMB CAN PRESUMABLY BE MADE, ACHIEVEMENT OF RUDIMENTARY NUCLEAR WEAPON SHOULD BE DOWNGRADED.

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6. HE REGRETTED THAT NUCLEAR ASSISTANCE HAD BEEN MOTIVATED BY COMMERCIAL AND POLITICAL REASONS UNRELATED TO NPT MEMBERSHIP, CLAIMING THAT, IN SOME CASES, NON-PARTIES HAD EVEN COME OUT AHEAD. HE HELD THAT IAEA REPORT ON TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM SHOWED CLEARLY THAT NO DISTINCTION MADE BETWEEN PARTIES AND NON-PARTIES. HE RECOMMENDED THAT INCREASED FUNDS AND FACILITIES BE CHanneled THROUGH IAEA EARMARKED FOR NPT PARTIES AND THAT EXPORTS

TO NON-PARTIES BE CONDITIONED ON RECIPIENT'S ENTIRE FUEL CYCLE
BEING PLACED UNDER IAEA SAFEGUARDS.

7. FARTASH URGED NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS TO ADOPT IAEA GUIDELINES
ON PHYSICAL PROTECTION AND INTEGRATE THEM INTO THEIR NATIONAL
CONTROL SYSTEMS. RE ARTICLE V, HE HELD THAT EARLY EXPECTATIONS
FOR PNES HAD NOT BEEN MET, BUT NOTED THAT US AND USSR HAD NONE-
THELESS BEEN UNWILLING TO ABANDON THEM. HE CALLED FOR CREATION
OF INTERNATIONAL PNE SERVICE, WHICH WOULD BE CARRIED OUT THROUGH
IAEA OR SEPARATE BODY, WHICHEVER PROVED MORE EFFICIENT.

8. NISIBORI (JAPAN), TAKING FLOOR AS NPT SIGNATORY, HELD THAT
OUTCOME OF REVCON CLOSELY RELATED TO NPT RATIFICATION IN DIET.
WITH RESPECT TO SAFEGUARDS, HE CALLED FOR CONCRETE MEASURES TO EN-
SURE THAT PEACEFUL NUCLEAR COOPERATION DOES NOT RESULT IN PROLIF-
ERATION. HE CONSIDERED IT NECESSARY TO ESTABLISH INTERNATIONAL
PNE REGIME AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE THROUGH STUDIES OF TECHNICAL,
ECONOMIC, LEGAL, AND OTHER ASPECTS OF PROBLEM. NISIBORI URGED
THAT, APART FROM TIMING OF ESTABLISHMENT OF SUCH A REGIME, NWS,
WHETHER OR NOT PARTO TO NPT, SHOULD "REGRAIN FROM CONDUCTING
NUCLEAR EXPLOSION TESTS WITHOUT ANY RESTRAINT UNDER EXCUSE OF THE
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT OF PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS."

9. NISIBORI MADE ONLY VAGUE REFERENCE TO QUESTION OF SECURITY
ASSURANCES, EXPRESSING HOPE THAT SOME TANGIBLE RESULTS ACCEPTABLE
TO ALL PARTICIPATING STATES WILL BE PRODUCED AT CONFERENCE THAT
WILL REMOVE ANXIETY OF NNWS AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE. HE ALSO TOOK
MODERATE LINE ON ARTICLE VI, APPEALING TO NWS TO MAKE FURTHER EF-
FORTS TO REALIZE MEASURES ON NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SUCH AS SALT
AGREEMENT CURRENTLY UNDER NEGOTIATION AND CTB. HE ADDED THAT
NON-ADHERENCE BY TWO NWS IMPEDED PROMOTION OF NUCLEAR DISARMA-
MENT, AND CALLED ON THOSE STATES TO JOIN TREATY.

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ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 EA-06 NEA-09 IO-10 ISO-00 ERDA-05 AF-06

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USIA-06 SAJ-01 NRC-05 /121 W

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R 081405Z MAY 75
FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2741
INFO AMEMBASSY BONN RYEY
AMEMBASSY BERN
AMEMBASSY DUBLIN
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
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10. KOCH (DENMARK) SAID NPT HAD WORKED WELL. HE CALLED ON REV-
CON TO PROVIDE IMPETUS FOR CTB, AND ASSERTED THAT PNES WERE NOT
ONLY U PROBLEM FROM STANDPOINT OF PROLIFERATION -- IT ALSO AP-
PEARED DOUBTFUL THEY WOULD BE OF ECONOMIC ADVANTAGE.

1. MACEACHEN (CANADIAN SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS)
MAINTAINED THAT, WHILE NPT HAS DISCRIMINATORY FEATURES AND WEAK-
NESSES, IT NONETHELESS SERVES INTERESTS OF NNWS AND REMAINS BEST
AVAILABLE BARRIER TO PROLIFERATION. RE ARTICLE VI, HE EXPRESSED
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HOPE THAT FINAL DOCUMENT OF CONFERENCE WILL CONTAIN FIRM RECOM-
MITMENT BY NWS TO NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT. HE SAID CANADA WELCOMED
ANY INTERIM STEPS TO FACILITATE ACHIEVEMENT OF CTB, BUT BELIEVED
STRONGLY THAT, TO MEET OBJECTIVE OF NON-PROLIFERATION, CTB MUST
BE ACHIEVED AT EARLIEST POSSIBLE DATE.

12. RE ARTICLE IV, HE INDICATED THAT: (A) CANADA INTENDS TO
PROVIDE, WITHIN OVERALL AID PRIORITIES, INCREASED AMOUNTS OF
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE IN NUCLEAR AREA, BILATERALLY AND THROUGH
IAEA, TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES PARTY TO NPT, (B) FUTURE CANADIAN
BILATERAL OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE FOR FINANCING OF NUCLEAR
PROJECTS WILL BE UNDERTAKEN SOLELY TO PARTIES, AND (C) NPT STATUS
WILL BE "AN IMPORTANT FACTOR" IN GOC DECISIONS ON PROVISION OF
EXPORT FINANCING IN NUCLEAR FIELD.

13. RE SAFEGUARDS, MACEACHEN ASSERTED THAT (A) CANADA WILL PRO-
VIDE NUCLEAR MATERIALS, EQUIPMENT, AND TECHNOLOGY ONLY ON BASIS

OF BINDING COMMITMENTS THAT PRECLUDE USE OF CANADIAN SUPPLIES IN DEVELOPMENT OF ANY NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICE, (B) USSR SHOULD JOIN OTHER DEPOSITARIES IN ACCEPTING SAFEGUARDS ON CIVIL NUCLEAR FACILITIES, AND THAT THIS STEP BY THREE POWERS BE FOLLOWED BY HALT IN PRODUCTION OF FISSIONABLE MATERIALS FOR MILITARY PURPOSES, AND (C) CONFERENCE SHOULD ENCOURAGE FURTHER ACTION TO ESTABLISH APPROPRIATE PHYSICAL SECURITY STANDARDS.

14. RE ARTICLE V, MACEACHEN SAID THAT REVIEW BY GOC EXPERTS CONCLUDES THAT EXPERIMENTATION SO FAR BY US AND USSR HOLDS OUT LITTLE PROMISE FOR PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS OF PNE TO RESOURCE EXTRACTION OR ENGINEERING PROJECTS IN CANADA, AT LEAST DURING NEXT DECADE. IN ADDITION, IN CANADIAN VIEW IT IS UNLIKELY ANY COUNTRY WOULD SUFFER ECONOMIC DISADVANTAGE IF PNE EXPERIMENTATION OR APPLICATION WERE HALTED AT PRESENT TIME. INDEED, IT WOULD BE IN INTEREST OF NON-PROLIFERATION AND CTB TO HALT EXPERIMENTATION AT LEAST UNTIL RE-EVALUATION OF WORLDWIDE ENERGY NEEDS PRESENTS SOME COMPELLING CASE FOR PNE USE. IF EVALUATION DEMONSTRATES NEED FOR FURTHER EXPERIMENTATION, IT WILL BE NECESSARY TO ASSESS NEED FOR FORMAL INTERNATIONAL PNE REGIME. SUCH A REGIME SHOULD CALL ON NWS TO GIVE NOTICE OF AND REPORT ON PNE ON THEIR TERRITORIES.

15. ALZAMORA (PERU) HELD THAT FUTURE OF TREATY IS IN HANDS OF NUCLEAR STATES AND THAT MAINTENANCE OF STATUS QUO WOULD BE DIS-

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CRIMINATORY.

16. BINDSCHEDLER (SWITZERLAND) IN ONE OF THE MOST CONTENTIOUS STATEMENTS THUS FAR, STRESSED THE THEME THAT THE NPT PROVIDED FOR MUTUAL OBLIGATIONS OF NNWS AND NWS AND THAT LATTER HAVE NOT FULFILLED THEIRS. HE REFERRED SPECIFICALLY TO TWO PROBLEM AREAS: SECURITY OF NNWS AND PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY. RE FIRST AREA, HE SAID SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 255 INADEQUATE AND DID NOT IMPOSE OBLIGATIONS BEYOND THOSE IN UN CHARTER. THE SAME APPLIED TO THE JOINT US-UK-USSR DECLARATION OF 1968 IN WHICH TWO NUCLEAR STATES HAD NOT PARTICIPATED. BINDSCHEDLER NOTED NEGATIVE ASSURANCES WERE MORE CREDIBLE THAN POSITIVE ASSURANCES. SUCH NEGATIVE ASSURANCES SHOULD BE IN THE FORM OF AN UNDERTAKING NEVER TO THREATEN OR USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS AGAINST COUNTRIES THAT DO NOT POSSESS NUCLEAR WEAPONS OR DO NOT HAVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON THEIR TERRITORY. MOREOVER, SUCH NEGATIVE ASSURANCES MUST BE IN FORM OF TREATY GUARANTEES (E.G., PROTOCOL TO NPT) RATHER THAN UNILATERAL STATEMENTS.

17. RE SECOND PROBLEM AREA CONCERNING PEACEFUL USES, BINDSCHEDLER SAID IT WAS NECESSARY TO ASSURE THAT ALL PARTIES, INCLUDING NNWS, HAD THE RIGHT TO PURSUE PEACEFUL APPLICATIONS OF NUCLEAR ENERGY WITHOUT RESTRICTIONS. IN THIS CONNECTION, HE SPECIFICALLY EMPHASIZED RESEARCH ON FUTURE GENERATIONS OF NUCLEAR REACTORS,

INCLUDING THOSE EMPLOYING CONTAINED EXPLOSIONS TO PRODUCE FUSION. HE SAID THIS TECHNOLOGY LOOKED PROMISING AND DID NOT FIT INTO ARTICLE V. BINDSCHEDLER ALSO STRESSED COMMITMENT OF NWS TO SHARE NUCLEAR EQUIPMENT AND MATERIAL, NOT TO EMBARGO SUCH ITEMS IN THE FUTURE, AND TO SHARE PEACEFUL NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY. ONLY A MAXIMUM EXCHANGE IN CIVIL NUCLEAR FIELD COULD GUARANTEE INDEPENDENCE OF NNWS. HE SUGGESTED THAT THUS FAR THIS EXCHANGE HAD BEEN INSUFFICIENT. WHAT HAD TO BE AVOIDED WAS MONOPOLY OF NWS NOT ONLY IN FIELD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS BUT ALSO IN THE FIELD OF PEACEFUL USES.

18. ON ARTICLE V, BINDSCHEDLER INDICATED (A) IT CONCERNED ONLY MACRO-EXPLOSIONS, (B) IT HAS NOT BEEN CARRIED OUT, (C) IF PNES ARE NOT USEFUL, NWS SHOULD FURNISH INFORMATION TO PROVE THIS POINT, AND (D) NWS SHOULD SUBMIT THEIR PNES TO INTERNATIONAL CONTROL IF SUCH A SYSTEM IS INTRODUCED.

19. BINDSCHEDLER DEPLORED THE LACK OF A SYSTEM FOR SETTling DIFFERENTIAL OFFICIAL USE

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REFERENCES WHICH MIGHT ARISE IN CONNECTION WITH THE NPT AND SUGGESTED AN IMPARTIAL JUDGE SHOULD BE SET UP -- PERHAPS IN AN ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL TO THE TREATY. HE SAID THE MANY PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH THE NPT, INCLUDING AMBIGUITIES IN THE TEXT, REQUIRED THAT IT BE "ADAPTED." THIS COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED THROUGH AMENDMENTS OR PROTOCOLS RATHER THAN THROUGH A COMPLETE REVISION. HE CALLED FOR ANOTHER CONFERENCE -- A TRUE REVISION CONFERENCE -- PERHAPS IN LESS THAN FIVE YEARS. BINDSCHEDLER CONCLUDED THAT IT WOULD BE INDISPENSABLE TO CORRECT THE IMBALANCE IN THE NPT IF GREATER ACCESSION, INCLUDING THAT OF SWITZERLAND, WAS TO BE ACHIEVED. ABRAMS

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: NPT, TEXT, ARMS CONTROL MEETINGS, MEETING PROCEEDINGS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 08 MAY 1975
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: GolinoFR
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1975GENEVA03336
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: N/A
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D750162-0117
From: GENEVA
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1975/newtext/t19750570/aaaadlyr.tel
Line Count: 311
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION ACDA
Original Classification: LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 6
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: GolinoFR
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 01 APR 2003
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <01 APR 2003 by ElyME>; APPROVED <02 APR 2003 by GolinoFR>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
05 JUL 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: NPT REVCON: PLENARY GENERAL DEBATE, MAY 7
TAGS: PARM
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 05 JUL 2006